Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 11

Issue 4

Article 2

1923

Ultra vires No Defense in Private Contract
Harland J. Scarborough
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Contracts Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Scarborough, Harland J. (1923) "Ultra vires No Defense in Private Contract," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol.
11: Iss. 4, Article 2.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol11/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

ULTRA VIRES NO DEFENSE IN PRIVATE CONTRACT.
By PRoFEssoR HA

Nin J. SCARBOROUGH*

In this discussion, unless otherwise indicated, we wish to be
understood by the use of the term corporation or private corporation to mean a purely private corporation and at no time
to include public, quasi public, or semi-public corporations. Also
the expression ultra vires will be limited to the meaning "beyond
the authority" and shall not at any time mean "illegal" in the
sense that illegal is used in the law of contracts between midividuals. We are therefore not now concerned about illegal
contracts or public, quasi public or semi-public corporations.
We shall endeavor to leave out of our discussion the almost endless confusion brought about by the courts by the interchanging
of the terms ultra vires and illegal. It is the conflict rather
than the confusion that we desire to consider. This conflict is
largely brought about by two or three main differences or considerations: first, the doctrine of "special capacity" and "general capacity;" second, the difference in concepts concerning
public policy-what it is and how it is to be subserved.
For the first, suffice it to say that the business world in
America has outgrown the doctrine of special capacity and it
may be fairly said that the courts have, to a large extent, recognized this and in their transition from their former position
to another ground upon which to rest their opinions many in,consistencies and more confusion have come.
It is upon the second proposition that the modern conflicts
come, and it may be suggested that a proper consideration of
what public policy is, what it is to subserve and how it is to do
it will go a long way in solving the problem. First, let it be
said that in less than one out of every hundred of the cases before the courts is there any public policy to be preserved beyond
that vague and shadowy notion that has somehow clung to cormeans of
porate contracts. The direct and effective
keeping a corporation within its chartered powers is to have
the state to use the "big stick," quo warranto or scire facias.
It would seem that the courts have labored under the notion that
to allow ultra vires of the corporation to be set up as a defense
in an action purely private in its naiture would be an added de*Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
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terment to the corporation to enter upon ultra vires contract.
A little reflection will show the error existing herein. First of
all, as said above, there is in the great majority of such cases no
public policy, worthy of the name, involved; and to be perfectly
fair and honest in our thinking we shall have to conceed that
when all the conditions and cireumstances in these situations
are considered no harm has been done by the corporation
,having technically overstepped its chartered powers. For example, let us ask what harm to the public was done by the decision in Whitley Arms Company v. Barlow,' or what harm
would there have been by upholding instead of refusing to uphold, the contract in Marble Company v. Harvey?2 We answer,
"No real harm to the public." Now let us ask what harm to
the contracting parties by the present holdings, and the answer
is, Just that harm and no more that comes by allowing parties
to violate with impunity the contract into which they have in
good faith entered.
There is no more reason for allowing ultra vires to be set up
as a defense in an action upon a contract entered into by a corporation outside of its chartered powers, than for allowing the
defense of corporate existence to be attacked collaterally. It
has been long since settled law that the corporate existence can
not be pleaded by or against a corporation in any collateral proceeding and it is hard to understand why the courts should not
-takethe same view in references to ultra vires in all those contracts made by a purely private corporation. As said in the be163 N. Y. 62, 20 Am. Rep. 504. In this case, the plaintiff, Whitney
Arms Company, was incorporated to manufacture firearms and other
implements of war. It entered into a contract to manufacture railroad locks for the American Seal Lock Company, manufactured and
delivered the said locks according to the contract. In an action brought
against the trustees of the American Seal Lock Company, ultra vires
was held not a defense and that -plaintiff would be entitled to a judgment against the American Seal Lock Company for the debt.
292 Tenn. 115, 2 S. W. 427, 18 L. R. A. 252. Marble Company, an
Ohio corporation, with its place of business at Cincinnati, was organized "for the purpose of cutting, dressing . . . with other incidental and necessary powers essential to the carrying on said business"
and acquired the entire issue of the shares of stock made by a Tennessee corporation engaged in a similar business under a similar charter
and known as the McMillin Marble Company. The last acquisition
of shares was from Harvey, president of the McMillin Co. In suit by
the Ohio company to enforce against Harvey certain stipulations as
a part of the contract that he had entered into with it in the sale of
the stock, Harvey set up the defense of ultra vires of the contract on
the part of the plaintiff. Held a good defense.
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ginning, we do not extend this doctrine to contracts by corporations of a public or semi-public nature, for the apparent reason
that in the very contract made by these corporations the public
has an interest and therefore it is perfectly right and proper
that ultra vires would be allowed to-be set up as a defense to an
action brought upon the contract that is beyond the power of
such public or semi-public corporations, if so doing will subserve any useful or justifiable purpose.
To allow a corporation to enter into a contract with an individual or another corporation in good faith and with the hope
of gain to both parties and then to allow one or the other, upon
the disdovery that it will not be lucrative or will result in financial loss rto it, to disaffirm the contract on the ground that it is
ultra vires of the corporation, does not rest in good conscience.
The allowing of this disaffirmanee of contract is to allow too
easy a way for the corporation to back out of a bad bargain and,
as formerly said, subserves no public purpose. It is allowing
the corporation and in the one contracting with it to enter into
an ultra vires contract with the absolute assurance that upon
discovery by one of the parties that the contract is not to be as
favorable to it as it had hoped when entering upon the same to
rescind it without any penalties attaching thereto. This enables
it to say to the other party who has been relying upon the contract and has made certain outlays, perhaps, "Bear uneomplainingly the loss that you have sustained -to date and any other that
you may sustain, that is neither here nor there to me." The
court; stamps its approval and so it is. Now instead of this
working as a determent to the corporation from entering into
ultra vires contracts it has the directly opposite effect. Corporations and those dealing with them know that in such instances the only consequence -thatdoes come is that the contract
may be declared a nullity and hence why should they be careful
as to the contracts they enter into. The matter being cared for
in this way, the inactivity of the state is to be expected; whereas
if the ultra vires of the contract were not allowed to be set up
in the civil action on the contract by one of the parties the
procedure would be to have the state investigate whether or not
the corporation had entered into an ultra vires contract and if so
it should either have its charter taken by the state or some other
proper punishment according to the offense committed. It may
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be, and we believe it is, a valuable and necessary thing to recognize ultra vires contracts of a corporation bat it must be done by
the proper authority, namely, in a direct proceeding by the
state.3 Now it makes little difference to us whether this refusal
to recognize this element of the contract is placed upon the doctrine of an estoppel, 4 implied warranty, irrelevancy or any other
reasonable ground satisfactory to the one applying it, just so
ultra vires is disallowed as a defense in the civil action on the
contract. This is the important thing. We recognize that the doctrine herein contended for is not now the prevailing opinion; but
keeping in mind the great changes 5 that have come about in the
last half century in the attitude of the courts toward the ultra
vires contract, we hazard the opinion that it will be the law within a comparatively short period of time. The doctrine of ultra
vires is of the court's making, and after its being established, it
has given the courts untold trouble in the dealing with it. Courts
have-been constrained to allow inroads upon their doctrine time'
and again until it now may .be safely asserted that in contracts
wholly executed the courts will not allow ultra vires to be plead3d to set aside the contract but will leave the parties where it
finds them and by the great weight of authority the contract
executed upon one side is sustained and a great tendency in the
courts to sustain a contract partly executed upon one side if injustice would be done in failure to sustain the contract; but
it is with reference to the executory contracts that practically
3 "The doctrine of ultra vires is a most powerful weapon to keep
private corporations within their legitimate spheres, and to punish
them for the violation of their corporate charters, and is probably not
envoked too often, but to place that power in the hands of the corporation itself or a private individual, to be used by him as a means
of obtaining or retaining something of value which belongs to another,
would turn an instrument, intended to effect justice between the state
and corporation Into one of fraud as between the latter and innocent
parties. Such is the modern doctrine. . . . If such a body transcend
its powers, it commits a wrong against the state, and ordinarily It Is
for the state, only, to call it to account for such violation" Zinc Carbonate Co. v. First Nat. Bk., 103 Wis. 125, 79 N. W. 229.
4 See cases collected in 29 A. & E. Encycl. of L. 57, note 1.
5 By way of illustration, see Timm v. Grand Rapids Brewing Co.,
160 Mich. 371, and cases therein cited for some things that thirty or
forty years earlier would have been held ultra vires and not an Implied power; while in Simpson v. Directors of Westminster Palace
Hotel Co., 8 H. L. Cas. 712, is an example of a situation that was re-

garded as constituting a hard problem to determine whether it were
ultra vires in 1860, which today we would have no trouble in declaring

an implied power and not at all ultra vires.
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all the courts allow ultra vires to be set up as a defense and it
is with reference to this that we wish these considerations to be
especially applied. Whatever may -have been the value in the
past of allowing this defense it may be said that it has outgrown
its usefulness and should be discarded. We have reached a
period in industrial development in which we have no use for
ultra vires as defense in the private action. Parties to a purely
private contract -have no more interest in one or the other being
held to the terms of same from the public standpoint than any
other member of the public. To 'hold a corporation within the
straight and narxow way of its chartered power is the business of the state; and to undertake to protect the public interest
by mixing this up with private matters not only does not produce but defeats the desired results. To allow a corporation,
even tho it has exceeded its given chartered authority to set up
ultra vires of its contract and thus relieve itself of the burdens
of a contract entered into in good faith both upon its own part
and upon the part of the one with whom it contracts, has a
tendency to cause it to enter into rather than to deter it from
the entering upon other ultra vires contracts. It is our contention that if we would prohibit the corporation to plead as
a defense, when sued upon a contract, -that it had no power to
enter into it and place the obligation upon the state and the
stockholders to see to it that the corporation stay within its corporate authority we would obtain the result that is desired,
namely; that corporations do not exceed their chartered power.
Proceeding upon the theory that the question of the contract being ultravires of the corporation is only a public concern we are
irresistably 'brought to this conclusion.
It is perfectly proper to ask the question, what of it if a
purely private corporation does exceed the particular powers
that are given it -by its charter? There are those who would be
ready with the answer that if we do not hold a corporation
within the bounds set there would be no purpose in setting forth
in its charter the powers that a certain corporation may exercise.
We agree; but this is no answer, for the apparent reason that we
all insist that a corporation should stay within its chartered
powers. Our split is not on this point but on the point of how
we are to keep it within its limits. Our contention is that this
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duty does not rest in any way upon the parties to a private contract and has no place in a private action brought by one of the
contracting parties against the other. We are not, at any time,
unmindful of the necessity of -holding the corporation within its
chartered powers but let the proper agency for the doing of this
thing be invoked. An assumption of power on the part of a corporation is in fact not usually an infringement upon the rights
of other persons. Ordinarily, it does not interfere with their
personal security, their property, or their personal liberty. The
only argument for restricting 'corporate authority is that of
public policy and hence it should 'be done by the agency of the
state. We believe that statutory and common law prohibition
should be made applicable to corporations and individuals alike.
As said before, the matter of prohibited and illegal contracts is a
very different thing from those contracts entered into by the
corporation in excess of its power. Under the present industrial
situation in this country we should regard that there is practically no fundamental difference between the right of a commercial corporation and the right of an individual to enter into a
contract.
The courts hold quite generally that an ultra vires contract
can be enforced by the court whenever justice demands it. We
ask, Why should not the courts always enforce the contracts as
made by the parties and leave to the state the responsibility of
seeing to it that a corporation should not exceed its chartered
authority? Were thisthe law and applied without any wavering one or two examples being made of a corporation's violation
of its charter -by the taking of its charter would be effective in
bringing about the result desired. Further it would relieve the
courts of a large amount of litigation over questions that are of
no value from a constructive public policy "standpoint. It
would cause a corporation or individuals dealing with the corporation to abide their contracts and not allow contracts to be
lightly set aside which would produce a result far preferable to
that being produced by the present holdings.
It would serve no useful purpose to enter upon any historical investigation of the origin and causes of the erroneous
ideas which have prevailed upon the subject. Much confusion
has evidently been caused in this, as well as in other branches of
corporate law, by the failure to bear in mind the difference be-
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tween the purely private corporations and public and semipublic corporations. Municipal corporations are not associations but are sulb-divisions of the state government and hence our
remarks are not meant to apply to them.
Much has been said about the inability of courts to uphold
an ultra vires contract of a corporation because it asks the court
to maintain a contract that the corporation had not the power
to enter into. And not a few assert that it is asking the court
to enforce a void contract. The courts find no inconsistency in
holding a corporation liable for tort and yet it is perfectly clear
that no authority is given or conferred by law to commit a tort.
Just so an ultra vires contract of a corporation is not void and
may be supported by a court just as readily as to hold a corporation liable for its tort. All the more would this course of
procedure be found logical if we should bear in mind that no
illegal or ultra vires contract is before the court when the court
takes the stand that it will not allow such to be set up as a defense; until such is allowed to be put in evidence as a defense,
presumably there is before the court only a valid contract and
hence the court would not be enforcing either a void or ultra
vires contract by following the doctrine herein set forth.
The invalidity of a contract entered into without capacity
has been frequently validated by a subsequent act of the legislature. This, undoubtedly, shows that the lack of authority to
enter into a contract is to be regarded as governed by the remedy
merely and the question is not at all whether or not there is a
contract, because there is no power in the legislature to create
the contract between the parties where none exists.
Another objection made to this doctrine is that it would
deprive stockholders and creditors of their rights. Reflection
upon the matter will reveal that there is no real and valid right
that stockholders have in this situation that should be protected.
Why should a stockholder be permitted to be the one of many
who organize a corporation and place by his vote directors in
charge thereof and then unload all of his responsibility to see
that the directors do not enter into ultra vires contracts on the
shoulders of the other party with whom his corporation, thru its
If we would place this responsibility
directors, contracts?
namely,
upon the stockholders and directors of
where it belongs,
a corporation, we would soon free the community of corporations
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overstepping their chartered powers, or at least reduce same to a
minimum. If every director of a corporation should know that
he is the one responsible financially to the stockholders when he
undertakes for his corporation to engage in ultra vires contracts
there would be produced care on the part of directors in the
management of corporations with reference to ultra vires transactions such as cannot possibly be produced by our present
methods. Furthermore stockholders would with greater care
select the directorate of their corporations.
As to the insistence that the creditors are wronged by allowing money of the corporation to be used in channels not provided for under its chartered powers, it -may be observed that in
only a few instances are creditors concerned one way or the
other with the consideration as to the channels of corporate investment and the matter of the courts' holding upon the question; and we further believe it only fair to say that in those eases
in which there would seem to be some interest, that it is not different in kind than that in the contract between private individuals and is not deserving of more protection by the courts;
the matter of the contract is a purely private matter and should
be governed by the same laws that govern the private contracts
of individuals.
It is beclouding to the thinking to allow circumstances and
conditions accompanying an ultra vires contract of an insolvent
corporation to be compared with those of a solvent individual,
for the allowing unequal situations to be compared has a tendency to prejudice the mind against the uldtra vires contract as
tho it were the offender when in truth it perhaps has had no
part to play in the situation. It is largely the influence of these
outside considerations that have seemingly directed the courts in
their decisions under many circumstances. The meaning may be
illustrated as follows: Bank B loans X the sum of five thousand dollars upon the distinct promise of X that he will invest
it in the building of a home. Without the knowledge of B, X
invests the said sum in an entirely different enterprise, making
the contract with C. Certainly no one would assert that X
could escape liability on his contract with 'C by setting up that
he had not invested his money according to his promise to B.
Now in this situation, so far as private contracts are concerned,
if we consider X a corporation and the contract with C one be-
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yond the power of X to make, our opponents will say it cannot
be enforced. There is no more business reason for allowing
the enforcement of one than the other. Why, we ask, should not
the legal reason follow in this situation the business reason ? This
view is supported by the case of Harris v. Independence Gas
Company,6 from which we quote at length in note below.
If there is disagreement with the writer in believing that
the present business condition in this country demands the adoption of the policy herein set forth, perhaps we could agree that it
is fast approaching that situation and that the legal methods
employed to care for the situation should be immediately
changed. May we not agree that instead of the rule being (as
176 Kan. 750, 92 Pac. 1123, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1171. Judge Mason
speaking of the cases in which the defendant has been held estopped to
set up the defense of ultra vires says, "But they hold that it must have
some discretion in the manner of carrying out the purposes of its
creation-some freedom of action-it is amenable to the same rules of
conduct as a natural person, and may estop itself to question the
validity of an agreement it has assumed to make, or may acquire the
right to Invoke a similar estoppel in its own behalf. Where this theory
is accepted,. recovery may be had upon a contract which is in fact void,
simply because its validity can not be put in issue.

.

.

. These

cases have been criticized for the use they make of the word 'estoppel'
as descriptive of the principle upon which they are based. It is argued
that, as a corporation must know the terms of its own charter, and as
one dealing with it is charged with like knowledge, neither party to an
ultra vires contract can be misled in that respect and therefore there
must always be lacking an essential element of what could, with technical accuracy, be called estoppel. This, however, is a mere question
of terminology. The requirement that one shall be consistent in conduct-shall not occupy contradictory positions, shall not retain the advantages of a transaction, and reject its burdens-is often spoken of
as a form of estoppel. The term is convenient and, if inaccurate, is
not misleading. This rule of estoppel affords a good workig hypothesis
to accomplish just results. If it fails to accomplish all that might be
desired in a practical way, it is because it is not made sufficiently farreaching. It is generally held to be inapplicable to purely executory
contracts, one reason stated b~ing that, 'Where neither party has acted
upon the contract, the only injustice, caused by a refusal to enforce it,
Is the loss to the parties of the prospective profits, and this is too
slight a consideration to weigh against the reason of public policy for
declaring it void and not enforceable.' 29 A. & E. Encycl. of L. 49, 50.
"It might seem reasonable that a system that attempts not only to
protect a party to an ultra vires contract from actual loss, but where
equity requires It, to insure to him actual fruits of his bargain, ought
for the sake of completeness and symmetry to enable him to insist
upon the performance even of a purely executory contract. It certainly
seems against conscience that one who has entered into a contract in
the expectation of deriving a profit from it may, upon discovering the
probability of a loss, repudiate it and escape responsibility by raising
the question of corporate capacity. Parties to a contract who deal with
each other upon the assumption that one of them is a corporation, are
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it now is) that courts, with one exception, -will not enforce the
executory contract (seemingly for no other reason than that it is
executory) and will only enforce the executed and partially executed contracts when injustice would be done by not enforcing
them, the rule should be that all of these contracts should be
enforced (not allowing ultra vires to be set up as a defense) unless by clear reason it is shown that to enforce the contract
would result in injustice and be against public policy considered
under the light of all the circumstances.
ordinarily precluded from questioning the validity of its organization.
*
. .So
that for the purpose of such private litigation, the body
claiming to be a corporation, and having a colorable existence as such,
becomes such to all intents and purposes, as much as though it were a
corporation de jure. And in Security Nat. Bk. v. St. Croix Powoer Go.,
117 Wis. 211, 94 N. W. 74: 'This court, ,by a series of decisions, has
held that, when - corporation enters into business relations not authorized by its corporate grant of power, the doctrine of ultra Vires can
not be used by it, or by the person with whom it assumes to deal, as a
means of defeating the obligation assumed. The state alone can take
advantage of the abuse.'
"Where a recovery is sometimes permitted under the contract itself,
upon the principle of estoppel, the question whether it has been carried
out is likewise of manifest importance, there being a difference in
degree, at least, between the attitude of one who has merely entered into
an engagement in expectation of obtaining an advantage from it, and
that of one who has actually reaped its benefits in whole or in part.
But the doctrine that only the state can challenge the validity of acts
done under color of a corporate charter, if accepted, must necessarily
protect an executory contract from collateral attack, equally with one
that has been executed. The court is convinced of the soundness of the
view that, in the absence of special circumstances affecting the matter,
neither party to even an executory contract should be allowed to defeat
its enforcement by the plea of ultra vires. The doctrine is logical in
theory, simple in application, and just in result. It, of course, does
not apply to contracts which are immoral, or which are illegal (as
distinguished from merely unauthorized), or to those made by public
corporations. Nor does it forbid interference by a stockholder to protect his rights as such."

